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Cognitive studies of psychosis present us with a paradox: 
The positive symptoms of psychosis largely involve illusory 
social experiences, and yet our current measures of social 
cognition, at best, only weakly predict the presence of pos-
itive symptoms and more strongly predict negative symp-
toms (Mehta et al., 2013; Ventura, Wood, & Hellemann, 
2013; Ventura, Wood, Jimenez, & Hellemann, 2013).
One probable reason is that our current concepts of 
social cognition do not capture the full range of relevant 
cognitive function for disturbed social experience in psy-
chosis (Gallagher & Varga, 2015; Schilbach, 2016; Yager 
& Ehmann, 2006). We argue here that a core feature of 
the phenomenology of psychosis is the experience of 
illusory social agents and that social agent representation 
is a useful framework for understanding disturbed social 
cognition in psychosis, as well as social reasoning and 
interaction more generally. This article reviews the evi-
dence from studies of psychosis to support this position 
and subsequently discusses the feasibility of a social 
agent representation approach in terms of the evidence 
from studies of normal social cognition.
First, it is worth clarifying what we have in mind when 
discussing social agent representation. Building on previ-
ous work on auditory hallucinations (Bell, 2013; Wilkinson 
& Bell, 2016), we argue that human social agent represen-
tation involves the ability to create, use, and maintain 
internal representations of social actors for use in both 
implicit and explicit social cognitive function. In particular, 
social agent representation (a) is present to differing 
degrees of complexity throughout development; (b) 
involves the capacity to internalize models of social actors 
including their physical and psychological attributes and 
requires these representations to be maintained and 
updated through implicit and explicit learning; (c) can 
involve representations of differing specificity and com-
plexity—from individualized to general, from sparse to 
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rich; (d) is used in both “online” and “offline” social rea-
soning to predict behavior (i.e., during live social interac-
tion and when the agents being considered are absent); 
and (e) could be drawn on for reasoning about described, 
notional, or hypothetical individuals as needed.
We suggest that psychosis is a model example of disor-
dered social agent representation, and we begin by 
reviewing the research on the experience of anomalous 
social agents in psychosis and note how current theories 
of psychosis do not adequately address this core aspect of 
the condition. With regard to typical cognition, the role of 
social agent representations has been subject to research 
across a number of disciplines and domains, but this evi-
dence has not been well integrated. Subsequently, we 
bring this research together to note how a social agent 
representation approach is supported by research on nor-
mal and comparative social cognition and note links with 
studies of psychosis where relevant. We conclude with 
specific hypotheses generated by this approach and dis-
cuss recommendations for future research in terms of 
understanding psychosis and more prosaic social cogni-
tive functioning.
Illusory Social Phenomenology in 
Psychosis
One of the most striking aspects of the delusions and hal-
lucinations of psychosis is that they are, in large part, 
social experiences, by which we mean that they most 
commonly involve the experience of being affected by 
illusory social actors, as opposed to being largely, or 
equally, about natural or nonintentional events. Similarly, 
we can contrast the social experience of psychosis with 
the experiences of people diagnosed with, for example, 
social phobia, where the concerns principally center on 
the thoughts and actions of genuine social actors. Psycho-
sis is distinguished by the experience of having vivid but 
illusory social agents intrude and often persist in your 
social world.
These delusions or hallucinatory experiences may 
“involve” illusory social agents of numerous types. For exam-
ple, they may involve personally identified agents (for exam-
ple, a family member or a historical or religious figure), 
groups (neighbors or the CIA), supernatural or fictional fig-
ures (angels or TV characters), or social agents who are 
entirely idiosyncratic and seem to be recognized solely by 
the individual who experiences them. There are many strik-
ing examples in the literature: James Tilly Matthew’s belief 
that he was being persecuted by a gang of magnetic spies 
using an “air loom,” each of whom he identified individually 
(Haslam, 1810/1988; Jay, 2012); Mellor’s (1970) report of a 
patient who experienced television host Eamonn Andrews 
inserting thoughts into his mind; and Jackson, Hayward, and 
Cooke’s (2011) case series including “Lucy,” who heard the 
voices of a “guardian angel, grandparents, and dead rela-
tives,” to name but a few. These illustrative examples are 
supported by strong evidence from systematic studies, which 
we review in the next section, that show that psychotic 
symptoms commonly have clear social content and involve 
the experience of illusory social agents.
Auditory verbal hallucinations
Among psychotic symptoms, auditory verbal hallucina-
tions are the most widely researched in terms of social 
content (review in Bell, 2013). Hallucinated voices can 
differ in the extent to which they are experienced as rep-
resenting specific agents, from voices that do not seem to 
represent clearly defined agents (such as shouts or mur-
murs from crowds) to voices that are experienced as 
being individual agents to voices that reflect specific indi-
viduals (Wilkinson & Bell, 2016) with the latter being the 
most common. In a large psychiatric sample of 199 voice 
hearers, McCarthy-Jones et al. (2014) reported that 70% of 
voice hearers had voices that were identifiably similar to 
people they had encountered in the past. Nayani and 
David (1996) reported that 61% of voice hearers from a 
psychiatric sample could ascribe a specific identity to their 
voices and another 15% experienced voices that were 
described as familiar but unknown. In a qualitative study 
of 50 psychiatric voice hearers, Beavan (2011) reported 
that characterizing voice identity was a central theme of 
the experience of hallucinated voices, present in all of the 
study participants. A more recent qualitative study by 
Upthegrove et al. (2016) on hallucinated voices in young 
people with first-episode psychosis found that the con-
cept of “entity, as though from a living being with com-
plex social interchange” was one of the two main 
categories of characteristics (the other being differing feel-
ings of being in control of the voice). Corstens and Langdon’s 
(2013) phenomenological study on 100 psychiatric voice 
hearers reported that “the most prevalent reported experi-
ence was to hear voices that could be clearly personified 
in terms of age, gender, and name.” In their study, 94% of 
people reported adult voices and 47% reported that they 
had the experience of a voice representing a family 
member and 47% a known acquaintance. Woods, Jones, 
Alderson-Day, Callard, and Fernyhough (2015) reported 
on a study of 153 voice hearers, of whom 69% experi-
enced voices that were characterful in some way—that is, 
were experienced as “people or person-like entities with 
distinct characteristics such as gender, age, patterned 
emotional responses or intentions.”
Further studies have reported that the majority of 
voice hearers engage with their voices through interac-
tive conversations (Garrett & Silva, 2003; Leudar, Thomas, 
McNally, & Glinski, 1997) and that voice hearers report 
social relationships with hallucinated voices that are 
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experienced and understood in similar ways to relation-
ships with people (Hayward, Berry, & Ashton, 2011). In 
the perceived relationship with the voice, the power 
dynamics reflect power dynamics in external social rela-
tionships, and this is a significant mediator of distress 
(Paulik, 2012). This evidence suggests that hallucinated 
voices are typically interacted with and experienced as 
psychologically credible social agents.
Nonsocial auditory hallucinations, which may include 
mechanical sounds like bells or whistles, or may include 
voice hallucinations that are not experienced as repre-
senting or coming from social agents—such as palinac-
ousis (the experience of illusory echo on genuinely heard 
phrases)—can occur on their own or alongside socially 
themed hallucinations (Woods et al., 2015). However, 
these nonsocial experiences are clearly in the minority, of 
which the majority are social and agentive in nature 
(Wilkinson & Bell, 2016).
Delusions
Delusions also have a strongly social component, as has 
been reported by studies on delusional theme. Persecu-
tory delusions are consistently reported as the most com-
mon type (Ellersgaard et al., 2014; Junginger, Barker, & 
Coe, 1992; Musalek, Berner, & Katsching, 1989; Yamada, 
Nakajima, & Noguchi, 1998), which are by definition 
social, as are delusional jealousy, erotomanic delusions, 
and most types of delusional misidentification. Other 
delusions may not be social by definition but commonly 
are. For example, grandiose delusions may commonly 
involve beliefs about social links to prominent people 
(Suhail & Cochrane, 2002), whereas delusions of external 
control and passivity, although not defined in relation to 
social actors, are invariably social, with individuals believ-
ing that they are being controlled or influenced by exter-
nal groups or individuals (Hirjak, Breyer, Thomann, & 
Fuchs, 2013; Spence, 2001). A study by Green et al. (2006) 
on the content of persecutory delusions in psychiatric 
patients that specifically investigated the presence and 
types of social agents found in the delusions reported that 
they typically involved single (50%) or multiple (50%) 
persecutors that were human in nature (81.2%) and iden-
tifiable to the individual (53.6%). When the social content 
of delusions from psychiatric patients with psychosis is 
studied broadly, the vast majority involve experiences of 
specific social agents (Bell et al., in preparation).
To contrast, a nonsocial psychotic symptom would be 
one where the experience involves no other social actors. 
For example, delusions of negation (i.e., Cotard’s delu-
sion) or infestation are often nonsocial in this manner (for 
example, the cases in Solla, Cannas, Orofino, & Marrosu, 
2015; Stanciu, Penders, & Oxentine, 2015). Delusions 
solely about the natural world (“there will be a tsunami”; 
Palmira, Stompe, Narbekovas, & Bunevicius, 2008) can 
also be nonsocial if they are not elaborated to include 
other social actors. However, as with hallucinations, delu-
sions that lack social content are in the minority.
Social phenomenology and current 
theories of psychosis
Despite the strong social theme of these experiences, 
most theories of delusion or hallucination formation do 
not address why these phenomena are typically social, 
rather than nonsocial. Waters et al.’s (2012) integrated 
model of cognitive mechanisms in auditory verbal hallu-
cinations focuses almost entirely on explaining how 
internally generated mental phenomena could be experi-
enced as nonself and does not attempt a cognitive expla-
nation of why auditory verbal hallucinations are typically 
experienced as social agents rather than just hallucinated 
but depersonalized words or speech (the content of audi-
tory verbal hallucinations is described as possibly “deter-
mined by factors such as perceptual expectations, mental 
imagery, and prior experience/knowledge [e.g. memo-
ries],” but no further elaboration is given). In other words, 
this model, like most others, accounts for why the experi-
ence is “not me” but offers no account of why it is of 
“somebody else.” Similarly, Allen, Larøi, McGuire, and 
Aleman’s (2008) and Allen et al.’s (2012) structural and 
functional brain connectivity model does not address 
social aspects of hallucinated voices despite significant 
overlap between the identified areas involved in auditory 
verbal hallucinations and the “social brain” (Kennedy & 
Adolphs, 2012).
Current theories of delusions are similarly inadequate 
in explaining the prominence of illusory social agents in 
delusions. Some theories exclude social factors (Braun & 
Suffren, 2011; Frith, 1992; Hemsley, 1993), whereas others 
tackle social factors implicitly by restricting themselves to 
persecutory delusions that are by definition social but do 
not explain why most delusions are typically social rather 
than nonsocial (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, & 
Kinderman, 2001; Freeman, 2007; Freeman & Garety, 
2014). Two-factor accounts of delusions (reviewed in 
Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2011) implicitly suggest that 
the first factor, an anomalous experience, could be social 
in content if it involved social perception—such as 
reduced autonomic responding to familiar people in Cap-
gras delusion—but does not explain why this is usually 
interpreted in terms of illusory social agents (in the case 
of Capgras, “identical looking impostors” having replaced 
family members) rather than a delusional but alternative 
explanation without illusory agents (“my relatives have 
become empty shells”) except to say that this happens 
due to “reasoning deficits” in the second factor. Kapur’s 
(2003) aberrant salience model also does not explain why 
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social experiences are more common, as presumably 
aberrant salience would affect the perception of social 
and nonsocial experiences equally. Indeed, the fact that 
social isolation increases the risk of psychosis and anoma-
lous experiences (Broome et al., 2005) suggests that a 
simple model where socially themed psychotic symptoms 
are more likely to arise due to aberrant salience occurring 
during the most commonly encountered (e.g., social) 
experiences would also be unlikely. Nelson, Whitford, 
Lavoie, and Sass (2014) do suggest a brief explanation for 
why psychotic symptoms are typically social in theme, 
hypothesizing that psychotic symptoms arise due to the 
weakening of the influence of memory-based context on 
current interpretations and that these representations are 
commonly social in nature, although they provide no evi-
dence for the claim. Clearly, there is a wide explanatory 
gap between the social phenomenology of psychosis and 
the current scope of theories that attempt to explain its 
symptoms.
Psychosis as a window on social agent 
representation
This contrast between the phenomenology and current 
scientific accounts suggests that the common presence of 
illusory agents in psychosis is worthy of explanation but 
is currently underinvestigated. We argue that the most 
parsimonious explanation for the presence of illusory 
agents in psychosis is that, rather than emerging de novo 
from a breakdown in other cognitive processes, they 
reflect dysfunction of existing social cognitive systems for 
social agent representation. Here, we draw on the con-
ceptual tools of cognitive neuropsychiatry, where symp-
toms are understood as a breakdown in the function of 
normal cognition and may be a guide to its structure 
(Halligan & David, 2001), to suggest that the social phe-
nomenology of psychosis may arise from a dysfunction 
in social agent representation—an important organizing 
principle for normal social cognition.
A Place for Agent Representation in 
Social Cognition
Traditional approaches to social cognition have been 
understood as being built on a set of neuropsychological 
functions that, using Schilbach’s (2014) distinction 
between online and offline social cognition, typically 
reflect “online” or “live” social interaction to allow peo-
ple to make decisions during the interaction period. 
These have included agency detection, to distinguish 
agentive objects from nonagentive objects ( Johnson, 
2003), person and affect recognition via face (Todorov, 
Ida, Evans, & Haxby, 2007), and voice perception (Belin, 
Bestelmeyer, Latinus, & Watson, 2011) and mental state 
attribution—traditionally conceptualized as “mindread-
ing,” “mentalization,” or “theory of mind” (Frith & Frith, 
2012; Olsson & Ochsner, 2008). Notably, this latter aspect 
is typically conceptualized in the literature as having 
conscious metacognitive components as well as implicit 
and automatic aspects (Mitchell & Phillips, 2015), and 
we note that the implicit functions would be character-
ized as an “online” function as we describe it here, 
whereas the conscious metacognitive aspect could be 
either an “online” function or equally applied to “offline” 
social cognition (as discussed in the following section). 
However, it is clear from the extent of current social 
cognition research that there is an inclination towards 
understanding processes used in “live” or “online” social 
interaction.
Offline social agent representation
Although these are clearly essential functions, this 
approach neglects the fact that everyday social cognition 
is frequently, and perhaps most commonly, focused on 
individuals who are not present and therefore does not 
involve direct perception and reasoning about ongoing 
social communicative acts, which is what is most typi-
cally tested in lab studies. There are exceptions, such as 
theory of mind problem-solving tasks, but these are lim-
ited in terms of the potential extent of “offline” social 
cognition as they typically require reasoning about hypo-
thetical “one-off” or brief scenarios that do not require 
models of social agents to be maintained over time, 
tracked, or substantially updated as they would be in our 
most common forms of social interaction. Evidence for 
this primarily “offline” nature of social cognition has been 
found in several studies. Studies that have analyzed the 
content of social speech suggest that the majority of our 
talk is about people not present at the conversation 
(Dunbar, 1993, 2004; Dunbar, Marriott, & Duncan, 1997). 
In terms of mental state attributions, Bryant, Coffey, 
Povinelli, and Pruett’s (2013) experience sampling study 
found that these were made more frequently when peo-
ple were not interacting with others than during social 
interaction itself. Mar, Mason, and Litvack’s (2012) experi-
ence sampling study of daydream content found that the 
majority of individuals (73.2%) reported that their inter-
nal thoughts “frequently” or “always” involved other peo-
ple. Even when considering inner speech, which is 
typically conceptualized as self-generated, self-directed 
conscious thought, evidence suggests that even here 
social cognition is a prominent factor. McCarthy-Jones 
and Fernyhough (2011) reported that one quarter (25%) 
of all “inner speech” reported by the participants involved 
representations of other people’s voices.
From a parasocial perspective, it is also worth noting 
that we can easily apply “offline” social reasoning to indi-
viduals with whom no “live” social interaction will likely 
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ever take place (for example, in the case of politicians or 
celebrities) and, indeed, for “individuals” who only exist 
as social concepts because they are deceased, are fic-
tional characters in novels or films, or purely exist as 
social stereotypes (for example, we can consider how a 
“policeman” or a “grandmother” might react in a certain 
situation, despite not having a specific personal identity 
in mind). Indeed, research on the use of “theory of mind” 
in understanding fiction (e.g., Dodell-Feder, Lincoln, 
Coulson, & Hooker, 2013; Panero et al., 2016) is entirely 
based on this premise, and we note that much theory of 
mind research focuses on, for want of a better word, “fic-
tional” characters in experimental paradigms where the 
participants are aware that the judgments they make are 
not about real people or genuine social situations.
We suggest that these “offline” social cognitive pro-
cesses may be more influential in the content of psy-
chotic experiences than “online” social cognition, given 
that symptoms more commonly reflect this type of social 
experience, even when colored by perceptual distor-
tions. For example, the situation of hearing a hallucinated 
voice is more akin to imagining a conversation, even 
when colored by perceptual experience, than it is like 
having a face-to-face conversation, which is affected by a 
range of nonauditory cues (e.g., Ross et al., 2011; Tjan, 
Chao, & Bernstein, 2014). Indeed, physical auditory 
properties in hallucinated voices are less prevalent than 
social agentive properties (Woods et al., 2015), suggest-
ing the social cognitive dimension has been overlooked 
by largely perceptual theories. Along similar lines, delu-
sions typically involve a belief that illusory social actors 
are “behind” or “involved” in events, even when the 
events or communicated acts being misinterpreted are 
genuine (Startup & Startup, 2005), suggesting that social 
cognition is key even without a clear hallucinatory basis 
for the experience.
A developmental perspective on social 
agent representation
Fields (2014) has noted that the social agent construct 
appears to be a “fundamental, and quite possibly innate, 
ontological category for human infants.” The ability to dis-
tinguish between animate and inanimate objects develops 
in early infancy, with infants associating some animate 
properties with people by 6 months of age (Rakison & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2001). Infants as young as 5 months old 
will attribute goals to agentive (self-propelled) nonhuman 
objects (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). Indeed, agent-based 
reasoning seems pervasive throughout early childhood. 
Kelemen (2004) has reviewed evidence to show that 
infants approach natural phenomena with a “promiscuous 
teleology”—that is, a tendency to primarily understand 
objects as having being made for a purpose by or as 
intentional agents. This is despite the fact that Western 
parents tend to give and reinforce explanations for objects 
that involve nonintentional causal mechanisms or events 
rather than intentional ones, suggesting that “agent-first” 
reasoning can be present despite cultural indoctrination to 
the contrary (Kelemen, Callanan, Casler, & Pérez-Granados, 
2005).
By their first birthday, infants are not only able to asso-
ciate mental attributes to specific agents (Buresh & 
Woodward, 2007), but they can also track the identities of 
individual social actors (Xu & Carey, 1996). These build-
ing blocks of social agent representation remain through-
out life, providing general and sparse level representations 
that are later complemented by the eventual availability 
of more specific and socially detailed representations as 
cognition progresses throughout development.
Studies in adults show that biological motion is 
detected and processed differently to similarly com-
plex nonbiological motion (Blake & Shiffrar, 2007; 
Neri, Morrone, & Burr, 1998). Indeed, judgments of 
intentionality are readily inferred from relatively sim-
ple motion contingency (Blakemore, Sarfati, Bazin, & 
Decety, 2003; Santos, David, Bente, & Vogeley, 2008). 
In psychosis, these judgments are affected in that peo-
ple with paranoid delusions tend to overattribute 
intentionality (Blakemore et al., 2003) and communi-
cative intentions (Okruszek et al., 2015) from agentive 
motion, suggesting an overinterpretation of agentive 
intention from implicit agent-detection processing.
In middle childhood, from approximately 4 to 12 years 
old, explicit reasoning about social agents emerges and 
develops (mostly studied as “theory of mind”; Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001) as does the experience of illusory 
social agents. In a large sample of children between the 
ages of 5 and 12 years, approximately half reported hav-
ing interacted with imaginary companions (Pearson 
et al., 2001), and evidence suggests that children are able 
to integrate physical characteristics and personality into 
their models of imaginary companions with “whom” they 
have conversations (Gleason, Sebanc, & Hartup 2000). It 
is worth noting that the presence of imaginary compan-
ions has been found to be associated with both the ten-
dency to hear words amid a sound stimulus of 
unstructured phonemes (Fernyhough, Bland, Meins, & 
Coltheart, 2007) and better social cognitive development 
in terms of representing and understanding others’ men-
tal states (e.g., Davis, Meins, & Fernyhough, 2014; Roby 
& Kidd, 2008) even in children at high risk for developing 
problem behaviors (Taylor, Hulette, & Dishion, 2010). In 
contrast, imaginary companions associated with negative 
psychiatric outcomes are typically not experienced as 
under voluntary control (“noncompliant imaginary com-
panions”; Jardri et al., 2014) or remain beyond their typical 
developmental period in middle childhood, suggesting an 
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altered developmental pathway that affects social agent 
representation.
In adolescence, there is now a significant amount of 
evidence that the development of identity is partly built 
on the perspectives of others and that tracking and mod-
eling the perspectives of specific individuals develops 
markedly during this period as an essential ability for 
navigating this challenge (Blakemore & Mills, 2014; 
Pfeifer & Peake, 2012; Sebastian, Burnett, & Blakemore, 
2008). Notably, although hallucinations are common 
throughout childhood, new onset hallucinated voices 
predicted very little general psychopathology in 7- to 
8-year-olds (Bartels-Velthuis, Jenner, van de Willige, van 
Os, & Wiersma, 2010) but a 2.5 to 5 fold increase in gen-
eral psychopathology in 12 to 13-year-olds (Bartels-
Velthuis, van de Willige, Jenner, van Os, & Wiersma, 
2011), suggesting that the experience of persistent illu-
sory social agents is more likely to be pathological during 
specific points in social development. Indeed, the devel-
opmental trajectory of social agent representation also 
seems to mirror the trajectory of illusory social agent 
experiences that include both developmentally normal 
and psychosis-like experiences.
Social agent representation: Evidence 
from neuroimaging
Research on recognition of individuals has long posited a 
notional “person identification node” in the cognitive 
system for face and perception, which has been described 
as drawing on a semantic memory for recognition (Belin 
et al., 2011; Bruce & Young, 1986). In terms of more com-
plex information, “person knowledge” has been cited as 
being retrieved during recognition tasks and has been 
shown to doubly dissociate from general autobiographi-
cal memory after brain injury, with each showing the 
potential to be independently impaired from the other 
(Haslam, Kay, & Hanley, 2002).
Imaging studies suggest that people knowledge 
involves representation distinct from objects and nonhu-
man animals based on patterns of neural activation. An 
fMRI study by Mitchell, Heatherton, and Macrae (2002) 
reported that semantic judgments about people and 
objects could be distinguished by a unique pattern of 
brain activity that included the medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC), superior temporal cortex, intraparietal sulcus, 
and fusiform gyrus. Using a similar paradigm, Mason, 
Banfield, and Macrae (2004) asked participants to report 
whether a common set of behaviors could be performed 
by people or dogs, noting that reasoning about people 
was particularly associated with activation in the right 
middle and medial frontal gyri. In a facial recognition 
task, Todorov et al. (2007) reported that previously asso-
ciated personal characteristics modulated fMRI activation 
even when irrelevant to the task, suggesting that person 
knowledge was being retrieved automatically.
Several studies have tested whether patterns of neural 
activation can be used to distinguish social agents from 
Fig. 1. Development of normal and anomalous social agent representation through childhood and adolescence. 
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the self, or individual social agents from each other. Tomlin 
et al. (2006) used an economic exchange game and 
found fMRI activation in the cingulate gyrus was suffi-
cient to discriminate self from other across response 
types in the task. Other studies have found that self–other 
distinctions are more apparent in the mPFC, with “dis-
similar others” showing less overlap than “similar others” 
when activation is compared with self-judgments (e.g., 
Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Schurz, Kogler, Scherndl, 
Kronbichler, & Kühberger, 2015).
Studies on “personality models” (Park, 1986; Park, 
DeKay, & Kraus, 1994) have noted that we seem to main-
tain and update representations of individuals’ personali-
ties on which we can consider future or notional behavior. 
An imaging study based on this work by Hassabis et al. 
(2014) reported that the individual being considered, 
albeit in an experimental task limited to four notional 
individuals, could be identified solely through the pattern 
of activation in the mPFC. This is in line with findings 
from Welborn and Lieberman (2015), who reported neu-
ral evidence for “person-specific theory of mind” in that 
target individuals could be identified through mPFC acti-
vation in “theory of mind” tasks. Interestingly, activation 
in this area seems to be specific to the perception that the 
participant is interacting with a human agent, as mPFC 
activity distinguishes perceived human from perceived 
nonhuman agents even when behavior is identical 
(Chaminade et al., 2012) and people representation can 
be distinguished from objects and locations based on 
activation patterns (Szpunar, Jacques, Robbins, Wig, & 
Schacter, 2014).
From the evidence to date, mPFC activity seems suffi-
cient to distinguish between individual social agents, 
although it is unlikely that the spatial distribution of neu-
ral representations will remain so straightforward as evi-
dence for the link between brain activity and social agent 
representation becomes better understood. Nevertheless, 
the fact that individual social agents, albeit characterized 
by experimentally controlled differences, can be distin-
guished by neural activation suggests that individual 
agent representation is plausible in terms of differences 
in the functioning of key areas in the social brain.
Social agent representation and theory 
of mind
Theory of mind is, for many, the paradigmatic cognitive 
ability for representing and understanding other minds. It 
is worth noting that this term is used to mean a range of 
different things in the literature, and the research has 
been noted for its “inconsistent and under-specified uses 
of relevant terminology” (Mitchell & Phillips, 2015), 
meaning that it is almost always possible to find a study 
on theory of mind that seems to cover a particular area 
of social cognition. To clarify, the concept of theory of 
mind we are using here is the explicit, largely conscious 
metacognitive system involving the ability to infer and 
predict the intentions, thoughts, desires, behaviors, and 
beliefs of other people (Frith & Frith, 2012; Green et al., 
2008). We argue that social agent representation is not 
simply theory of mind, although theory of mind is clearly 
an important component. First, it is worth noting that 
although theory of mind is impaired in people with 
schizophrenia, the deficit is independent of the presence 
of the positive symptoms of psychosis, including para-
noid delusions (Bora Yücel, & Pantelis, 2009; Garety & 
Freeman, 2013), which, as noted, largely involve the 
pathological presence of illusory social agents. There is 
some evidence that positive symptoms may be linked to 
overuse of “theory of mind” (“hypermentalizing”; Back-
asch et al., 2013; Clemmensen et al., 2014; Montag et al., 
2011), although this would not be sufficient to explain 
why illusory social agents tend to feature in positive 
symptoms rather than just the misattribution of intentions 
to existing agents. Similarly, theory of mind deficits (for 
example, after brain injury) are not in themselves predic-
tive of psychotic symptoms. However, we also want to 
note that social agent representation involves representa-
tion and reasoning beyond what is usually considered 
within the remit of theory of mind (Frith & Frith, 2012; 
Gelman, Noles, & Stilwell., 2014)—not least the tracking, 
maintenance, updating, and de novo creation of social 
agent representations that includes both psychological 
and physical characteristics.
Indeed, as we note more fully in the following section, 
the tracking, maintenance, and updating of social agent 
representations can be done in animals without “theory of 
mind” as it is normally understood. It is also worth noting 
that there is evidence that social-agent representation has 
seemingly automatic and “irresistible” effects on the wider 
cognitive system in humans. For example, the perceived 
presence of an observer has a measurable impact on an 
individual’s task performance even when it is irrelevant to 
task completion (Capozzi, Cavallo, Furlanetto, & Becchio, 
2014; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley 
Scott, 2010), suggesting an involuntary propensity to co-
represent the perspectives of external agents (Gallotti & 
Frith, 2013).
Comparative Aspects of Social Agent 
Representation
Cross-cultural aspects of anomalous 
social agents
Boyer (2003) and Bering (2006) note that the tendency to 
attribute natural events to unseen agents (what Barrett & 
Johnson, 2003, call hypersensitive agency detection, and 
what Shermer, 2012, calls agenticity) seems to be a uni-
versal characteristic of the world’s cultures. Several 
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researchers have suggested that many of the principal fea-
tures of religion or belief in supernatural agents rely on 
core aspects of social cognition that have primarily 
evolved for dealing with everyday social interaction (Atran 
& Norenzayan, 2004; Bloom, 2007; Boyer, 2003; Gervais, 
2013), suggesting that belief and consideration of super-
natural agents emerges from social cognitive processes. 
Indeed, an fMRI study of Christian religious participants 
during prayer showed robust activation of social cognitive 
networks when praying to God (Schjoedt, Stødkilde- 
Jørgensen, Geertz, & Roepstorff, 2009), and sociological 
studies have shown how putative spiritual entities are 
integrated into communities as social agents (Blanes & 
Espírito Santo, 2014). Notably, belief and experience of 
spiritually conceptualized supernatural agents seem to be 
on a continuum with psychosis-like experience, suggest-
ing that similar cognitive systems may underlie their rep-
resentation (Farias, Underwood, & Claridge, 2013; Pechey 
& Halligan, 2011; Peters, Day, McKenna, & Orbach, 1999).
Evolutionary role of social agent 
representation
One potential objection to citing social agent representa-
tion as a core focus of social cognition would be to say 
that it simply labels a general application of the cognitive 
system with no specific functional significance. It would 
be possible to argue, perhaps, that we equally have a 
“transport representation system” that distinguishes, main-
tains, and updates representations of specific vehicles. 
Perhaps a related but more focused criticism would be to 
suggest that social agent representation is simply an appli-
cation of other, already defined, higher level functions of 
the social cognitive system. Apart from the evidence pre-
sented above, which suggests that social agent represen-
tation seems to be cognitively and neurally distinct from 
the representation of nonsocial agents, we suggest there 
are also good evolutionary reasons why the ability to rec-
ognize, maintain, and update representations of social 
agents would be a core organizing principle in social cog-
nition and not simply one of any number of tasks for 
which it could be used. Working from the most basic level 
upward: Being able to distinguish agentive from nona-
gentive threats, being able to distinguish same-species 
agents from different-species agents, being able to distin-
guish between same-species agents, being able to main-
tain and update representations of agents to facilitate 
social organization and hierarchy, and being able to reflect 
on and reason about social agents when they are not 
present or are entirely notional are clearly key survival 
mechanisms and would likely be heavily selected for.
In terms of psychosis, we note that common delu-
sional themes are often an exaggeration of common sur-
vival concerns for social animals (Green & Phillips, 2004; 
McKay & Dennett, 2009). In light of the fact that this 
“exaggeration” occurs to the point where illusory agents 
tend to occur, we suggest that this reflects a dysfunction 
in a human system that has been subject to selection 
pressure and shaping during evolution.
Social agent representation in other 
species
Similarly, evidence against the fact that social agent rep-
resentation might simply be a label for a task completed 
by higher level cognitive or social cognitive functions is 
the fact that social agent representation is clearly present 
in animals who do not have higher level social cognition, 
such as “theory of mind.” For example, Cheney and 
Seyfarth (1990) have shown that East African vervet mon-
keys do not have “theory of mind” skills but do have 
highly complex social structures that require social agent 
representation and tracking. Indeed, social agent repre-
sentation is likely to be preserved in a wide range of 
social animals (Brent, Chang, Gariépy, & Platt, 2014; 
Emery & Clayton, 2009) with the complexity, rather than 
the presence of the social agent representation, varying 
with the cognitive capacity of the animal.
Conclusions and Implications for 
Future Research
From the evidence presented here, we argue that social 
agent representation is a key organizing principle of social 
cognition that follows a clear developmental pathway, is 
essential for both minimal survival and maximal social 
success, has both implicit and explicit components, is key 
for both online and offline social cognition, is culturally 
universal, and can be seen to break down in terms of the 
misrepresentation of social agents in the delusions and 
hallucinations of psychosis. We argue that social agent-
based reasoning needs to be further explored in social 
cognition research and that insights into social cognition 
can be gained from better understanding anomalous 
social agent representation, most notably in psychosis.
It is worth noting that we are not suggesting that this 
is a new or distinct “component” of social cognition but 
instead presenting a teleological view that highlights 
social agent representation as an organizing principle of 
which many of the already established processes form a 
part. We are also not suggesting that this is the only or 
primary involvement of social cognition in psychosis 
given extensive research on the role of existing social 
cognition measures in predicting negative symptoms par-
ticularly (Green, Horan, & Lee, 2015). However, it is also 
true that there is clearly a conceptual gap between our 
current concepts of social cognition and (a) how they 
explain social cognition as it is used in everyday life and 
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(b) how they explain mental state anomalies in psycho-
sis, and it is possible that a study of social cognition from 
a social agent representation perspective may lead to the 
identification of new cognitive mechanisms.
Although there has been a significant amount of 
research on psychosis and the misattribution of actions to 
the self or other, which implies but does not specify the 
role of other agents, the fact that psychosis often involves 
the experience of specifically characterized “others” sug-
gests that much of this research could be extended from 
distinguishing self–other to characterizing how the illu-
sory “others” come to dominate social cognition. Clearly, 
a socially richer approach to social cognition research is 
needed, in line with Schilbach’s (2016) advocacy for a 
“second-person neuroscience” that includes genuine 
social interaction within experimental paradigms and 
that more heavily emphasizes social interaction rather 
than social observation in the understanding of psychiat-
ric disorders.
Even with existing interaction or simulated-interaction 
paradigms, however, one difficulty is that most typically 
involve the serial or instant judgment of others’ intentions 
during experimental tasks (usually set up with a specific 
scenario) and do not involve the need to create, track, or 
update a representation of a particular social agent 
beyond a few trials at most. These sorts of limited para-
digms are likely to be sensitive to general cognitive or 
social cognitive impairments but not the social agent rep-
resentation difficulties most commonly present in psycho-
sis, which involves the experience of illusory but relatively 
long-lived social agents, rather than the experience of 
rapidly created spontaneous agent representations.
Studies that require participants to implicitly distin-
guish and track social agents (for example, by distin-
guishing individual agents based solely on their behavior 
in an economic exchange game and using this informa-
tion to inform future interactions) are likely to have addi-
tional ecological validity, in terms of biases on the 
formation and maintenance of social agents. We also 
argue that paying more attention to the phenomenology 
in the form and content of anomalous social agents is 
likely to provide an important window into normal social 
cognition, hopefully answering the current paradox as to 
why current measures of social cognition predict so little 
of what are fundamentally social symptoms.
Another area suitable for further investigation is social 
cognition with regards to illusory social agents them-
selves. Experimental studies typically group participants 
based on their clinical presentation (or lack of), but very 
little research has been done on, for example, social 
judgments regarding the social agents whom a person 
with psychosis believes, for example, is persecuting him 
or her or “whom” they experience as auditory hallucina-
tions. Comparing these judgments to judgments about 
real or imagined social agents may be revealing in terms 
of differences in social cognitive performance.
A social agent representation approach to social cog-
nition would also raise some specific hypotheses. In 
developmental terms, the ability to internalize models of 
social agents that exist in the “real world” should develop 
over time and should be the basis for being able to use 
spontaneously created social agent representations in 
social problem solving. This approach would also predict 
that although there should be some overlap between 
social neural networks that support “online” and “offline” 
social cognition, performance in tasks that test these 
respective abilities should be differently affected by alter-
ing parts of the neural networks that most support them. 
Similarly, neural activation associated with experiences of 
anomalous social agents, associated with but not 
restricted to psychosis, should reflect areas involved in 
social agent representation in normal social cognition.
One area of interest that has recently arisen is the 
extent to which internal representations of the self may 
be related to representations of others with the sugges-
tion that they may be different uses of the same core 
representation system (Friston & Frith, 2015; an overlap 
also reflected in the neuroimaging literature discussed 
previously). Indeed, one of the least understood aspects 
of psychosis are delusions of identity change, and we 
might speculate as to whether these are, paradoxically, 
social in nature, due to the representation of the self rely-
ing on some of the same social agent representation 
mechanisms that are used to represent other agents.
There is clearly a need for a much greater understand-
ing of social agent representation both in normal social 
cognition and in psychopathology. Although we have 
focused here on psychosis, as it seems to be the most 
striking example of anomalous and potentially dysfunc-
tion social agent representation, this approach also has 
clear relevance for other diagnoses where social cogni-
tion has been implicated, such as in autism and psychop-
athy (Happé & Frith, 2014). We hope that both 
methodological and theoretical innovations will better 
explore and develop this hypothesis in the future.
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